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PARTY AUTONOMY: HOW DOES ONE
SQUARE THE CHOICE-OF-LAW CIRCLE?
A Comment by Amos Shapira*
Choice-of-law theorists are characteristically prone to as-
signing a host of frequently incompatible policy goals to be fur-
thered through the workings of choice-of-law prescriptions. Yet
inflated expectations regarding the potential accomplishments
of the choice-of-law machinery are doomed to frustration: the
choice-of-law process, even in its most sophisticated version,
just cannot faithfully and effectively serve too many, often
irreconcilable, masters simultaneously. One should therefore
refrain from overstating choice-of-law methodological desidera-
ta. An overloaded choice-of-law apparatus just cannot carry the
burden and deliver the goods.
Still, a fair, rational and functional choice-of-law method
ought to be responsive-to a carefully measured, proportionate-
ly shaped extent-to the following five policy objectives:
1. Ease of judicial administration;
2. Uniformity and predictability of the result of litigation;
3. Vindication of parties' expectations and fair notice as to
the applicable law;
4. Advancement of the substantive law concerns of the
implicated legal orders through the elucidation and
evaluation of the underlying concrete policies of the
various legal standards involved; and,
5. Interstate and international harmony.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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I. EASE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION
An appropriate choice-of-law methodology should avoid
confronting the forum of litigation with insurmountable practi-
cal difficulties in its routine implementation. The need to econ-
omize on judicial time and effort is all the more pressing where
courts' dockets are crowded in general and choice-of-law litiga-
tion is not a rarity. Surely, the virtues of a simple, convenient
and efficient adjudicatory apparatus for the handling of choice-
of-law controversies are self-evident. No one can deny that
litigants, lawyers and judges are bound to benefit from an
easily workable, smoothly operational choice-of-law machinery.
Specific and simple choice-of-law rules forged ex ante by
the legislature are conducive to judicial economy. By the same
token, open-ended and complex choice-of-law standards, that
can only be invoked through ad hoc exercise of broad and es-
sentially unguided judicial discretion, will hardly serve the
need for ease of judicial administration. Yet the borderline
between guiding clarity and mechanical rigidity is often frus-
tratingly blurred. To be sure, judges are likely to welcome
brightline, hard-and-fast legislative directives that are de-
signed to facilitate the task of judicial decision-making. But at
the same time they are prone also to shun overly mechanical
and rigid statutory formulas and to seek ingenious escape
devices in order to avoid an unfair or unsound, and therefore
unacceptable, result otherwise dictated by the ostensibly gov-
erning black-letter rule. The truth of the matter is that some-
times simplicity in judicial administration is incompatible with
the complexity inherent in a certain branch of the law. A mo-
dality proposed for the regulation of a given problem-area is
bound-if it purports to be rational, principled and direc-
tive-to reflect the intrinsic complications of that same prob-
lem-area. An attempt to create ease of administration in a
legal field which is not endowed with the virtue of simplicity is
doomed to breed confusion and frustration. It is always better,
in the final analysis, to face up to the problem in its true di-
mensions and with its unconcealed complexities while striving
to maximize realistically the ease of judicial administration.
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II. UNIFORMrrY AND PREDICTABILITY OF THE RESULT OF
LITIGATION
The traditionally asserted overriding policy objective of the
choice-of-law process has been uniformity and predictability of
the result of litigation irrespective of the location of the forum.
Uniformity of result is expected to promote international har-
mony and cooperation in socioeconomic matters and to foster
predictability as to the governing law, thus facilitating private
legal ordering, ensuring stability and eliminating forum shop-
ping. It is also designed to guarantee equal treatment and
impartiality in choice-of-law adjudication. It goes without say-
ing that all these are values worthy of promotion in any legal
discipline. Yet, a substantial measure of uniform judicial deci-
sion-making in choice-of-law matters across national bound-
aries requires a uniform choice-of-law instrumentality common
to all legal systems-an ideal that is still largely unrealized.
Also, judges' propensity to resort to side-stepping techniques in
order to escape unacceptable results otherwise dictated by
mechanical-even if uniform-choice-of-law rules is bound to
undermine decisional uniformity and predictability.
Looking around, we must realize that practitioners learn
how to function in the legal sphere without absolute certainty,
resorting to educated guesses and conducting their affairs with
some doubt at the edges. This is so in a host of wholly domes-
tic legal settings and a fortiori in the real world of transnation-
al choice of law. Realistically viewed, the need for uniformity of
result is not equally pressing in each and every choice-of-law
problem area. As a corollary, the prospects of the actual real-
ization of this policy goal range over a wide spectrum from
reasonably promising to virtually non-existent. Universal uni-
formity of result is truly not required in many instances or is
overshadowed by other policy goals of the choice-of-law process.
Conversely, there are situations where-due to political, socio-
economic, humanistic or technological constraints-a uniform
pattern of decision-making across national frontiers is clearly
indicated. Where the need to secure accommodation of concrete
transnational concerns-such as the facilitation of multination-
al commercial activity-is acutely felt and widely shared, simi-
lar choice-of law standards are prone to emerge, either through
independent legal evolution in the various national communi-
ties or by concerted international or regional efforts in the
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form of multilateral conventions. Such choice-of-law standards
usually point to the application of the rule of decision of that
one of the involved legal systems which displays a paramount
interest in controlling the matter at hand. Thus, for instance,
the home community of a person is preeminently concerned
with his or her marital status. Similarly, the situs country has
a predominant interest in safeguarding its system of registra-
tion and ascertainment of title to local land.
A fair degree of uniformity of result, where it really pres-
ents a compelling necessity of international life, can best be se-
cured through multinational collaboration with a view to the
mutual adoption of uniform choice-of-law standards. To be uni-
formly adoptable and operative, such standards must be sim-
ple, "shortcut" choice-of-law directives, much in the traditional
system-pointing mold. Adherents of some of the modern ap-
proaches who recoil from the very notion of system-selecting
rules must realize that uniformity of result in distinctive prob-
lem areas is not a cost-free objective. Its promotion as a pecu-
liar transnational concern inhering in the multijurisdictional
context must be paid for at the expense of other choice-of-law
policy goals.
III. VINDICATION OF PARTIES' EXPECTATIONS AND FAIR NOTICE
AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW
Situations involving foreign elements present a fundamen-
tal jurisprudential dilemma: the reasonableness and fairness of
judging human conduct by foreign legal standards. The concept
of legal fairness postulates the existence of an appropriate
connection between the parties to the controversy at hand and
the legal norms in the light of which their rights and obliga-
tions are to be assessed. This notion of an appropriate connec-
tion between parties and the law governing them is frequently
depicted in terms of vindication of justified expectations as to
the applicable law.
The protection of the justified expectations of parties to
legal relationships is a much-acclaimed goal in all branches of
law, including private international law. It would clearly be
unfair to charge a person with liability under the laws of coun-
try A, for conduct undertaken by him or her with reasonable
reliance on the different laws of country B. It would likewise
be unjust suddenly to saddle one's transactions with a prohibi-
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tory or regulatory law, the applicability of which could not
have been foreseen at the relevant time. Thus the "vindication
of justified expectations" desideratum weighs very heavily in
choice-of-law literature. It imparts life to some cardinal choice-
of-law principles, such as the "party autonomy" rule enabling
the parties to a transnational contract to choose for themselves
the governing law. It also lends support to the idea of allowing
the litigants in a transnational tort case to agree, after the
dispute has arisen, on the applicable law (without prejudice to
the rights of third parties).
Nonetheless, one should be cautious not to overstate the
significance of subjective foreseeability and reliance in cases
entailing foreign elements. After all, to be deserving of legal
protection, alleged party expectations must first be actually
existing and susceptible of realistic ascertainment. To attribute
concrete expectations to litigants where such expectations have
never really existed, or are incapable of verification, is to ob-
fuscate legal reasoning. Indeed, the hypothesis that parties to
legal relationships invariably form specific expectations as to
the legal norms that will govern their interactions is highly
questionable in many instances, especially in contexts fraught
with foreign factors.
It may well make sense to reason in terms of concrete
expectations regarding the applicable law in the domain of
privately ordered, preplanned activity, such as in the field of
transnational commercial transactions. In many cases falling
within this category, the parties indeed are prone to be mind-
ful of the juridical implications of their planned activity and to
fashion their business policy upon an informed consideration of
relevant legal standards, local and foreign. Thus, for instance,
a manufacturer whose commercial engagements cut across
national boundaries is likely to foresee contingencies of in-
volvement with foreign laws (pertaining, say, to products liabil-
ity) and to account for them when determining prices or ac-
quiring insurance coverage. It would, therefore, only be fair to
vindicate as fully as possible (barring countervailing policy and
fairness considerations such as consumer protection) the con-
duct-influencing expectations formed by parties with regard to
the legal regulation of their transnational activities.
The situation is utterly different, however, concerning a
wide range of human interactions that ordinarily are devoid of
any meaningful prior legal ordering. These are not readily
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amenable to judicial elaboration in terms of subjective expecta-
tions as to the applicable rule of decision. Where people usual-
ly interact with little or no awareness of the possible legal
ramifications of their action, the "upholding of the parties'
expectations" desideratum may be nothing but an empty slo-
gan. Thus a host of ordinary personal injury tort cases are
simply not amenable to judicial reasoning based upon the
concept of subjective party expectations. The very notion of
crystallized choice-of-law expectations is incongruous in a con-
text of social interaction where the participants are not dis-
posed to fashion their conduct upon a prior consideration of
potentially applicable laws.
The notion of a required appropriate connection between
parties and applicable laws in cases entailing foreign elements
has thus far been addressed in terms of vindication of subjec-
tive choice-of-law expectations whenever they actually exist.
Yet the fundamental principle of fairness embodied in this
notion transcends the goal of upholding parties' concrete
choice-of-law expectations. This principle conveys the basic
idea that it is a threshold requirement of fairness in the
choice-of-law process that a sufficiently significant relationship
exists between a party and the legal regime by which his or
her situation is to be judged. This is an objective criterion that
is not necessarily related to any actual or presumed subjective
expectations as to the governing law. Under this criterion, the
fairness of judging conduct by foreign legal prescriptions is
ultimately dependent on whether it would be reasonable to
charge the party concerned with prior notice regarding the
potential foreign law connotations of the occurrence at bar. If
the party can reasonably be charged with fair notice as to the
possible transnational ramifications of the affair at hand then
one may conclude that an appropriate connection does exist
between that party and the foreign law which is to be applied.
Fair notice means that the party in question could have rea-
sonably perceived at the relevant time a possible contact with,
or potential impact upon, persons, property, institutions or
events that might fall within the prescriptive domain of a
given legal system. Hence, a litigant who actually was, or rea-
sonably could have been, mindful of possible involvement with
matters potentially subject to the legal management of a for-
eign country may not complain of lack of sufficient connection
between himself or herself and the normative order upheld by
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that country. By the same token, a choice-of-law methodology
that aspires to promote the idea of objective fair notice ought
to refrain from designating as applicable a system of law that
clearly has no appropriate relationship with a party to the
litigation.
IV. ADVANCEMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW CONCERNS OF
THE IMPLICATED LEGAL ORDERS THROUGH THE
ELUCIDATION AND EVALUATION OF THE UNDERLYING
CONCRETE POLICIES OF THE VARIOUS LEGAL STANDARDS
INVOLVED
The traditional approach builds on system-pointing choice-
of-law rules that purport to designate the governing lex causae
(whether domestic or foreign) in cases involving foreign ele-
ments. A conventional system-pointing choice-of-law rule com-
prises two structural components: a category of type-situations
(e.g., tort claims) linked to connecting factor (namely, a spatial
contact between a person, a relationship or an event and a
given country, e.g., the place of the tort). Once the matter at
bar is characterized as falling within a given category of type-
situations, the connecting factor attached to that category will
lead the forum to the designated governing legal system, be it
the lex fori or the law of a foreign country. Thus, conventional
choice-of-law rules are in essence system-selecting. They are
intended to furnish a reference to a country, the law of which
would ultimately provide the controlling rule of decision. And
such reference is supposed to be effected in deliberate disre-
gard of the content of the specific rule of decision (local or for-
eign) finally to be applied and in an acknowledged indifference
as to the merits of the concrete resulting outcome of the dis-
pute. Such multilateral directives are designed to furnish im-
partiality, reciprocity, certainty, uniformity and ease of appli-
cation to the choice-of-law process. Critics of the traditional
system, however, have persistently challenged its actual ability
to deliver these promised goods. In particular, they have point-
ed to the public policy barrier and to the notion of substantive
rules of direct ("immediate") or mandatory application as es-
cape devices, or longstop techniques, that in fact infuse a seem-
ingly multilateralistic system-pointing apparatus with un-
abashed unilateralistic, often parochial, choice-influencing
considerations.
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In sharp contrast to the traditional system-pointing para-
digm, current rule-selecting methods seek the maximization of
the substantive law concerns of the socio-legal systems entan-
gled in a choice-of-law situation. Rather than relying on stereo-
typed connecting factors, rule-selecting approaches call for a
functional analysis of the specific substantive legal rules poten-
tially involved as the very core of the choice-of-law process.
The distinguishing mark of this school of thought lies in its
fundamental assumption that all standards of law are designed
to further some distinct social concerns, randomly defined as
"public policies," "governmental interests," "socioeconomic
goals" and the like. The application of these standards in con-
crete situations, both purely local and those involving foreign
ingredients, must therefore entail a systematic probe into their
supporting purposes to determine their contemplated scope of
personal and territorial coverage. In this view, the appropriate
reach of all legal standards, domestic and foreign, can only be
delineated through an examination and evaluation of their
particular underlying rationale. Choosing the governing law
solely on the basis of stereotyped spatial connecting-factors,
and in deliberate ignorance of the tenor and purpose of the
potentially applicable laws, is therefore an irrational exercise
in futility. The choice-of-law process must be based on a func-
tional analysis of the social objectives underlying the substan-
tive rules, local and foreign, implicated in the dispute at bar.
It goes without saying that rule-selecting methods, like the
American "governmental interests" approach, are not conducive
to judicial ease of application. And the ad hoc exercise of
broad, potentially freewheeling, judicial discretion that is man-
dated by such methods is hardly compatible with the goals of
uniformity and predictability of result. Moreover, "governmen-
tal interests" enthusiasts are predisposed to impute to virtual-
ly every legal norm some underlying concrete socioeconomic or
political purpose. The intellectual premise of such a process
may become rather shaky as one encounters legal rules with
supporting policy goals that are unascertainable, obscure, tenu-
ous, cumulative, or even contradictory. In the absence of reli-
able information as to the intended policy function of the legal
norm in question, the process may readily degenerate into
speculative postulation, or even an outright fabrication, of
putative underlying policies, merely on the ground of their
assumed plausibility. To ascribe hypothetical purposes to con-
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crete legal rules, particularly foreign ones, on the basis of mere
conjecture is a judicial enterprise of dubious validity and utili-
ty.
Still, the advancement of the substantive law concerns of
the legal orders implicated in a choice-of-law situation is a
worthy policy objective in appropriate instances. Thus certain
normative arrangements-pertaining, for example, to matters
of social welfare, economic regulation, fiscal stability and mar-
ket institutions-are sometimes likely to be adversely affected
unless the particular substantive law supporting them is ap-
plied. Substantial and readily discernible socioeconomic bene-
fits or detriments may well count in the choice of the applica-
ble law. Indeed, it hardly makes sense to designate as applica-
ble a legal system whose relevant rule of decision is manifestly
"uninterested" functionally in controlling the matter at hand
or, conversely, to exclude the applicability of a legal system
whose relevant rule of decision is evidently "interested," given
its underlying objective, to govern the situation at bar. A
choice-of-law methodology that repeatedly and haphazardly
produces such unsound results cannot be accepted as rational.
To be sound and functional it should be responsive, in proper
cases, to a measured consideration of the intrinsic particular
policies animating the substantive laws that are candidates for
application.
V. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONY
It goes without saying that with transnational commerce,
much depends on transnational cooperation in the shaping of
choice-of-law standards. This may require national restraint
and moderation in the pursuit of parochial policy-goals and an
attitude conducive to mutual cooperation and compromise.
To generalize, and simplify, there are several principal
methodological approaches to the choice of the applicable law:
1. Hard-and-fast choice-of-law rules that build on rigid,
pointed connecting factors (territorial-e.g., the place of
the tort, the place of making or performing a contract, or
personal-e.g., the place of habitual residence of the
parties or a party to a transaction).
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2. "Soft," open-ended, flexible choice-of-law directives, such
as the American Restatement of Conflict of Laws formu-
la of "the most significant relationship,"' or the English
private international law concept of the "proper law" of
the contract.
3. "Party Autonomy," that is, empowering the parties to a
legal transaction or relationship to select for themselves
the governing law.
4. A choice-of-law process that shies away from specific,
black letter choice indicators, such as the American "gov-
ernmental interests" rather complex method of analysis.
Of course, legal systems may, and often do, opt for a combina-
tion of some or all of these (or similar) choice-of-law methodolo-
gies.
To again generalize and simplify-European legal systems
have displayed a traditional preference for statutory, hard-and-
fast jurisdiction-selecting rules rather than for nebulous choice-
of-law standards, let alone for no-rule policy analytical frames
that are saturated with ad hoc judicial discretion. In the field
of international intellectual property transactions personal
links (such as the habitual residence of the licensee or the
consumer) are likely-so it seems-to be preferred over terri-
torial connecting factors (such as the contract's place of making
or performance). In Europe one may also, I believe, notice a
traditional championing of the "party autonomy" principle
(that endorses contractual choice of the applicable law by the
parties themselves), moderated by a concern for the fair treat-
ment of consumer and other weak populations.
Professor Patchel points out the diverse attitudes of differ-
ent jurisdictions to intellectual property rights and the mani-
fest importance of intellectual property to all jurisdictions. She
emphasizes the territorial dimension of the "product" involved
in international intellectual property transactions. This would
seem to militate in favor of a territorialist choice-of-law ap-
proach. At the same time, she predicts that national courts will
be prone to ascribe much significance, in this field, to the pub-
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) cmt. c (revised 1988).
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lic policy exception and to the concept of mandatory, "immedi-
ately applicable" rules. Invoking such conceptual tools is, of
course, conducive to a frequent resort to the lex fori, namely,
national courts will be likely to tend to apply their own nation-
al law. Such an attitude is clearly incompatible with the princi-
ple of party-sponsored choice of law ("party autonomy"). And it
is hardly supportive of systemic concern for transnational har-
mony, respect and cooperation. How, then, can one square the
circle and tie together all these relevant-yet often contend-
ing-ingredients of territorialism, national parochialism, uni-
versalism and party autonomy and blend them into a coherent,
well-balanced choice-of-law system for international intellectu-
al property transactions? I am afraid that much more work
must still be done in this respect.

